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                                            ABSTRACT 
 
Academic management theory has a serious utilization problem. 
This article argues that it stands a better chance of being adopted 
for instrumental use if the theory is based on the paradigm of the 
“design sciences”, like medicine or engineering.  Most academic 
management research is based on the paradigm of the “explanatory 
sciences”, like physics. The mission of these sciences is to describe, 
explain and predict, while the core mission of the design sciences is 
to develop “tested and grounded technological rules”. The 
paradigm of the design sciences is applied to management research 
and I discuss the potential of solving its utility problem by 





In virtually all academic disciplines research is undertaken to create valid and reliable 
knowledge to pass on to students and to share with other interested parties. This also 
applies to research done in Business Schools. As most students of Business Schools 
aspire to careers outside academia, the use of research results for the practice of 
management should be a major issue.   
     Yet there are serious doubts about the actual relevance of present-day management 
theory as developed by the academic community. As far back as 1982, Beyer and Trice 
remarked, “Recently (....) scholars have expressed concern about why organisational 
research is not more widely used” (Beyer and Trice, 1982, p. 591). More recently, in his 
Presidential Address to the American Academy of Management, Hambrick (1994) 
sketched a dismal picture of the Academy’s impact and concluded that it might have 
mattered to the world of organisations and business, but that it did not.  
     Essentially, the solution Hambrick proposes is to improve the presentation of 
academic management research results to the outside world, in order to “open up the 
incestuous, closed loop of the Academy's conferences” (Hambrick, 1994, p. 13). This  
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may help. My thesis, however, is that the relevance problem of academic management 
theory is not caused primarily by poor presentation but by its very nature. Compare Kurt 
Lewin’s well-known adage, “nothing is quite so practical as a good theory” (Lewin, 1945, 
p.129). Assuming that  “good” means something like “scientifically valid and reliable” 
rather than “practical,” this article intends to qualify the adage: all good theories are 
practical, but some are more practical than others. 
     The nature of the products of a given research programme (in Lakatos’ sense, 1991) or 
“school of thought” (McKinley, Mone and Moon, 1999) is largely determined by its 
research paradigm. By “research paradigm” I mean the combination of research questions 
asked, the research methodologies allowed to answer them and the nature of the intended 
research products. Most academic research in management is based on the notion that the 
mission of all science
1 is to understand, i.e. to describe, explain and possibly predict (see 
e.g. Nagel, 1979; Emory, 1985). Some even state that “the essence of science is 
explanation by law” (Seth and Zinkhan, 1991, p35). But, also many non-positivists hold 
that the mission of all science is to create shared understanding, i.e. understanding of a 
certain phenomenon shared between the researcher and an informed audience, his 
scientific community (Peirce, 1960). 
     However, understanding a problem is only halfway to solving it. The second step is to 
develop (alternative) solutions. Understanding the sources of resistance to certain 
organisational changes, still leaves undone the task of developing  sound change 
programmes. Understanding the reasons for delays in New Product Development still 
leaves undone the task of developing effective product development systems. 
Understanding the changes on certain markets still leaves undone the task of developing 
successful strategies. Thus, besides description-driven research programmes in 
management one also needs prescription-driven research programmes in order to develop 
research products which can be used in designing solutions for management problems. By 
this I do not mean the actual application of scientific knowledge to solve a specific 
managerial problem - this is the domain of practitioners - but the development of 
scientific knowledge to solve a class of managerial problems, in other words, the 
development of abstract knowledge. Nor is it a plea to develop recipes, but rather a plea 
for the development of tested and grounded technological rules to be used as design 
exemplars of managerial problem solving. 
     The classics in our field like Taylor, Fayol and Barnard, did not shrink from 
prescription, but the subsequent scientisation of our field has greatly diminished the 
academic respectability of prescriptions. In this article I use analogies with various other 
disciplines, like medicine and engineering (which I call  “design sciences”), to analyse the 
nature of the academic research products used in problem solving and the nature of 
academic research producing these products. Furthermore, I use these analogies to show 
that prescription-driven academic research can indeed claim academic respectability. 
Subsequently, I  discuss the nature of research in management if based on the paradigm of 







THE UTILISATION PROBLEM OF ACADEMIC MANAGEMENT THEORY   
 
In the social sciences the utilisation problem is a well-known one (see e.g. the 1982 and 
1983 Special Issues of Administrative Science Quarterly on the utilisation of social 
science). In management theory it is sometimes seen as a dilemma: the rigour-relevance 
dilemma (see e.g. Schön, 1983). Management theory is either scientifically proven, but 
then too reductionistic and hence too broad or too trivial to be of much practical 
relevance, or relevant to practice but then lacking sufficient rigorous justification. March 
and Sutton (1997) remark that in other disciplines this dilemma is sometimes solved by 
separating the two contexts. However, in and around business schools “the soldiers of 
organisational performance and the priests of research purity often occupy not only the 
same halls but also the same bodies” (March and Sutton, 1997, p. 703). 
     In the natural sciences the utilisation problem is of quite a different order. Some 
tension may exist between basic and applied research including a possible difference in 
social status and competition for research resources. In general, however, two very 
effective partnerships are in place. There is the one between the natural sciences and 
applied fields like medicine and engineering and the other between researchers in any 
given field and the professionals of that field (often occupying the same bodies). 
      In the field of management the utilisation problem is both a well-discussed and thorny 
issue (Miner, 1984; Whitley, 1988). Researchers in this field operate within two 
reputation systems (Whitley, 1988; March and Sutton, 1997): the academic reputation 
system, which rewards rigorous research and the professional reputation system, which 
rewards relevant research outcomes and the professional training of prospective 
managers. 
      The priorities given to each system vary over time and sometimes resemble a 
pendulum. Prior to the Ford and Carnegie Foundation reports on American Business 
Schools (Gordon and Howell, 1959; Pierson and Others, 1959), priority was given to 
professional training, to the professional reputation system. At the time, the academic 
community regarded the field more or less as a practice-based craft. This was largely 
caused by the scant attention given to descriptive research and to the justification of the 
prescriptions given. Examples are the prescriptions on rational decision-making in 
organisations and the concept of top managers as rational, long-range planners. 
     The above-mentioned reports started a process of “scientisation”, resulting in a “New 
Look” for the American Business Schools (Schlossman, Sedlak and Kechsler, 1997; see 
also Whitley, 1988), which also had a strong impact elsewhere. This process of 
scientisation could have followed the example of the breakthrough of the engineering 
sciences in the nineteenth century: their assimilation of the laws and especially of the 
methods of the natural sciences to test solutions, transformed them from practice-based 
crafts to solid sciences. However, the Business Schools followed this example only 
halfway through. The insights and methods of the natural sciences and especially those of 
the social sciences were used to develop description-driven research programmes, while 
the interest in prescription atrophied. Gaining recognition in the academic reputation 
system became the main emphasis.  In time, this led to reactions like the Harvard 
Business Review papers ‘The myth of the well-educated manager’ (Sterling Livingstone, 
1971) or ‘Managing our way to economic decline’ (Hayes and Abernathy, 1988).  
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      Tensions between the two reputation systems are not typically American. In the 
Netherlands, for instance, the field of business economics has known fierce debates 
between the Amsterdam School, primarily interested in the academic reputation system 
and the Rotterdam School, more interested in the professional reputation system (Van 
Baalen, 1995)
2. In France one finds a somewhat similar competition between the more 
professional Grandes Ecoles and the more academic Universities. Recently in Britain 
Tranfield and Starkey (1998) voiced concerns with respect to the relevance and 
application of management research results, advocating more emphasis on mode 2 
knowledge production (using the distinction Gibbons et al. (1994) make between mode 1 
knowledge production, predominantly driven by academic concerns, and mode 2 
knowledge production, trans-disciplinary with intensive interaction between knowledge 
production and knowledge dissemination and application). Such tensions between 
academia and professional application may have stimulated the idea of the rigour-
relevance dilemma. However, this article is not based on the idea that there is a dilemma 
(in which case no satisfactory solution exists), but rather on the idea of Pettigrew's double 
hurdle: management theory should meet criteria of scholarly quality and managerial 
relevance (Pettigrew, 1996). Understandably, academics tend to worry more about the 
scholarly hurdle than about the relevance hurdle
3. 
     The utilisation problem discussed here concerns management theory as developed by 
the academic community. There is an abundance of management literature, which is 
widely read by managers but which does not meet scientific standards. This type of 
literature is dubbed “Heathrow-literature” by Burrell (1989) or,  more kindly, Literature 
on Principles (of management) by Whitley (1988). There are craftsman-like publications, 
based predominantly on first-hand experience (or on the experience of people one 
knows), that have a generalisation problem: what can be learnt from this experience for 
other contexts? Then there are metaphysical publications by management gurus (nomen 
est omen), that have a justification problem: on which observations and which logical 
reasoning are the recommendations based? These publications may perhaps succeed in 
taking Pettigrew's second hurdle, but fail at his first one. Improving the utility of 
academic management theory should make it a powerful competitor for these two types of 
management literature. 
     Beyer and Trice (1982) give an in-depth analysis of the process of utilising 
management research results. Among others, they distinguish between adoption, i.e. the 
decision by decision-makers within the user system to use certain research results, and 
implementation, i.e. the actual use of the research results by members of the user system. 
Another distinction is between instrumental and conceptual use of scientific knowledge 
(Pelz, 1978, cited in Beyer and Trice, 1982)
4. Instrumental use involves acting on 
research results in specific and direct ways, while in case of conceptual use the results are 
used for general enlightenment on the subject in question.  
     The primary interest of this article is the adoption of management research results and 
management theory for instrumental use. The problems of subsequent implementation are 
not very different from other problems of organisational change and implementation and 
are well-researched. I agree with Beyer and Trice’s statement, “The predominant use of 
organisational research probably occurs through graduate seepage's into organisations of 
new ideas, metaphors, and rationales for explaining human behaviour” (Beyer and Trice,  
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1982, p. 615). The conceptual use of management research results is indeed an important 
outcome. However, I fear that academic management research will retain its utilisation 
problem if this remains its only ambition. If the field takes its mission seriously, it should 
also aim for the more ambitious objective of adoption for instrumental use in order to 
produce theory relevant for management students and other interested parties. 
 
 
THE PARADIGM OF THE DESIGN SCIENCES   
 
My thesis is that a major inhibition for adopting academic management theory for 
instrumental use lies in the very nature of this theory, which is strongly influenced by the 
paradigm used for developing it. Kuhn's (1962) term “paradigm” as used by him has 
many different meanings. Here it is used in its sociological sense (Masterman, 1970): a 
system of “scientific habits” used by a group of scientists for the solution of scientific 
problems. More specifically, as stated in the introduction, by research paradigm I mean 
the combination of research questions asked, the research methodologies allowed to 
answer these questions and the nature of the intended research products. 
 
 
Formal, Explanatory and Design Sciences   
 
On the basis of the paradigms used, I distinguish three categories of scientific disciplines: 
1. the  formal sciences, such as philosophy and mathematics 
2. the  explanatory sciences, such as the natural sciences and major sections of the 
social sciences 
3. the  design sciences, such as the engineering sciences, medical science and modern 
psychotherapy. 
 
     The formal sciences are “empirically void”. Their mission is to build systems of 
propositions whose main test is their internal logical consistency.  
     The mission of an explanatory science is to describe, explain and possibly predict 
observable phenomena within its field. Research should lead to “true” propositions, i.e. 
propositions which are accepted by the scientific forum as true on the basis of the proof 
provided. The typical research product of an explanatory science is the causal model, 
preferably expressed in quantitative terms. 
     The mission of a design science is to develop knowledge for the design and realisation 
of artefacts, i.e. to solve construction problems, or to be used in the improvement of the 
performance of existing entities, i.e. to solve improvement problems. Architects and civil 
engineers deal predominantly with construction problems while medical doctors and 
psychotherapists deal mainly with improvement problems. Research aims at developing 
knowledge and its application should lead to the intended results. I use the term “design 
sciences” because the ultimate objective of research in these sciences is to develop valid 
and reliable knowledge to be used in designing solutions to problems. I prefer to avoid 
the term “applied sciences”, as this term suggests that the mission of these sciences is  
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merely to apply the basic laws of the explanatory sciences, thus disregarding the 
impressive body of knowledge developed by the design sciences themselves. 
      The idea to distinguish between explanatory and design sciences is strongly inspired 
by Simon’s The Sciences of the Artificial (Simon, 1969)
5. Much research within the 
design sciences is based on the explanatory paradigm, i.e. research aimed at describing, 
explaining and predicting in order to understand the setting of construction or 
improvement problems and to know the properties of the “materials” to be used. 
However, understanding alone is not enough. The ultimate mission is to develop design 
knowledge, i.e. knowledge that can be used in designing solutions to problems in the field 
in question. It is important to teach a civil engineer subjects like physics and mechanics, 
but in designing a bridge he or she needs the design knowledge developed by his or her 
discipline, like for instance the properties of different types of bridges. In the same way a 
medical doctor should have a working knowledge of physics and biology, but for medical 
problem solving he or she predominantly uses the results of clinical research. 
     In English the term “science” is often equated with “natural science”, which leads to 
the idea that the mission of all sciences is to merely describe, explain and predict and that 
such descriptive knowledge is sufficient for practitioners to solve their problems. Science, 
then, occupies Schön's (1983) “high ground of theory,” while practitioners operate “in the 
swamp of practice”. In the present article the focus is on the development of design 
knowledge, which occupies the middle ground between descriptive theory and actual 
application. In design sciences like engineering and  medicine a significant part of this 
knowledge is produced by academic research, which scores high in both the academic and 
in the professional reputation system.  
 
 
Design Knowledge and its Instrumental Use   
 
A design science does not develop knowledge for the layman, but rather for the 
professionals in its field. This means that design knowledge is to be applied by 
individuals who have received formal education in that field.  
     A professional, such as a medical doctor, architect, psychotherapist, mechanical 
engineer, lawyer or accountant, can be defined as a member of a well-defined group who 
solves real-world problems with the help of skills, creativity and scientific design 
knowledge (Freidson, 1973; Klegon, 1978, Schön, 1983, Abbott, 1996, Becher, 1999). 
     Each time a professional sets out to solve a unique and specific problem for a client, or 
in conjunction with a client, he or she does so by using the problem solving cycle, also 
called the regulative cycle (Van Strien, 1997). This cycle consists roughly of: defining the 
problem out of its “messy” context (Schön’s, 1983, “naming and framing”), planning the 
intervention (diagnosis, design of alternative solutions, selection), applying the 
intervention and evaluating. 
     The essence of professional work is designing, planning an action in advance or during 
the action (“reflection-in-action”, Schön, 1983). The outcome of this process is a design, 
which can be defined as a representation of a system or process to be realised. In general, 
a professional will make three designs (Van Aken, 1994): an object-design, the design of 
the intervention or of the artefact, a realisation-design, i.e. the plan for the  
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implementation of the intervention or for the actual building of the artefact, and a 
process-design, i.e. the professional’s own plan for the problem solving cycle; or, put 
differently, the method to be used to design the solution to the problem. 
     The term “design science” is used here to indicate that the mission of the academics 
involved is to develop scientific knowledge to support the design of interventions or 
artefacts by professionals and to emphasise its knowledge-orientation: a design-science is 
not concerned with action itself, but with knowledge to be used in designing solutions, 




The Repertoire of Design Knowledge   
 
In order to be able to make these designs, professionals have a repertoire of design 
knowledge at their disposal (Schön, 1983). This includes their own experience and that of 
their teachers, and the body of scientific design knowledge of their design science 
acquired during their training and continuing education. This design knowledge is 
general, i.e. valid for classes of cases. The problem of the professional, however, is 
always unique and specific. Therefore, general knowledge must be translated to the 
unique and specific case at hand. In this way, lawyers use jurisprudence from similar 
cases when dealing with their specific case and doctors use general descriptions of 
symptoms, diseases and therapies applied previously, when designing a therapy for a 
specific patient. 
     Design-repertoires contain three types of design knowledge, according to the three 
types of designs discussed above. The repertoire of a professional typically contains 
predominantly object knowledge, i.e. knowledge on the settings and properties of the 
artefacts or interventions to be designed. For a mechanical engineer this may be the 
properties of different types of bearings and for a medical doctor the effects of alternative 
therapies for a given disease. It may also contain realisation knowledge, e.g. knowledge 
on manufacturing technologies for a mechanical engineer and knowledge on various types 
of surgery for a surgeon. Finally, a design repertoire typically contains only a fairly 
limited amount of explicit process knowledge, i.e. knowledge on how to tackle the actual 
design process itself. Most professionals obtain their process knowledge in a craftsman-
like manner, i.e. by their own experience and by imitating their teachers and peers. 
Process-knowledge tends to remain largely tacit; professionals often find it difficult to 
express  their approach to design problems
6. 
     The design repertoires of well-educated and experienced professionals contain a large 
variety of knowledge. Within each of the three types of design knowledge discussed 
above, prescriptions are an important category. The logic of a prescription is “if you want 
to achieve Y in situation Z, then perform action X.” There are algorithmic prescriptions 
which operate like a recipe and which typically have a quantitative format and whose 
effects can be proven conclusively on the basis of observations through deterministic or 
statistical generalisation. However, many prescriptions in a design science are of a 
heuristic nature. They can rather be described as “if you want to achieve Y in situation Z, 
then something like action X could help”. “Something like action X”, means that the 
prescription is to be used as a design exemplar. It is a general prescription which has to be  
 
8 
translated to the specific problem at hand; in solving that problem, one has to design a 
specific variant of that design exemplar. Such a prescription typically has a qualitative 
format. The underlying logic is as stated above, but the actual formulation can use various 
formats. An example of an algorithmic technological rule is: in order to cure disorder Y, 
you follow a course of treatment consisting of taking 0.3 milligrams of medicine X during 
14 days. An example of a heuristic technological rule is: in order to cure disorder Y, you 
follow a course of treatment consisting of rest, exercising and a fat-free diet. The 
indeterminate nature of a design exemplar makes it impossible to prove its effects 




Tested and Grounded Technological Rules   
 
In the explanatory sciences, the research object is an “explanandum” (Van Strien, 1997) 
and the typical research product is the causal model: one or more dependent variables are 
explained in terms of one or more independent variables. Knowledge about the values of 
these variables can be used to predict the behaviour of the dependent variables. 
     In the design sciences the research object is a “mutandum” (Van Strien, 1997); these 
sciences are not too much interested in what is, but more in what can be. The typical 
research product is the prescription discussed above, or in terms of Bunge's (1967) 
philosophy of technology, the technological rule. A technological rule is “an instruction 
to perform a finite number of acts in a given order and with a given aim” (Bunge, 1967,  
p. 132). 
     Mankind has a long tradition of developing technological rules. Primitive societies not 
only developed technological rules to manufacture artefacts, but also to make rain, to 
pacify the gods, to increase fertility, to avoid natural disasters, and so on. So both the 
know-how of making a bow and arrow and the rain dance are examples of ancient 
(heuristic) technological rules. A major breakthrough occurred with the systematic testing 
of technological rules. A tested technological rule is one whose effectiveness has been 
systematically tested within the context of its intended use. The system of interest is 
treated as a black box, but under certain conditions specific interventions give the desired 
results (deterministically or stochastically). Traditional Chinese medicine is an example 
of a system of very powerful, tested technological rules. 
     The real breakthrough came when tested technological rules could be grounded on 
scientific knowledge (Bunge, 1967), including law-like relationships from the natural 
sciences. For instance, one can design an aeroplane wing on the basis of tested, 
technological (black box) rules, but such wings can be designed much more efficiently on 
the basis of tested and grounded technological rules, grounded on the laws and insights of 
aerodynamics and mechanics. The stunning progress of the design sciences since the first 
Industrial Revolution is based on the effective partnership between the explanatory 
natural sciences and the design sciences, which leads to systems of tested and grounded 
technological rules. Whereas the typical research product of the explanatory sciences is 
the causal model, the typical research product of the modern design sciences is the tested 
and grounded technological rule.  
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Clinical Research and the Reflective Cycle   
 
If the tested and grounded technological rule is the typical research product of a design 
science, the typical research strategy is clinical research, i.e. research on the performance 
of interventions or artefacts, executed within their context. 
     The causal model of the explanatory sciences is developed, typically, within a closed 
system (like a laboratory) in order to exclude (or control) the influences on the dependent 
variables from other sources than the independent variables of interest. A causal model 
may be partial, explaining only certain elements or aspects of the phenomenon of interest. 
     The technological rule, on the other hand, is typically studied within its intended 
context in order to be as sure as possible of its effectiveness, also under the influence of 
less well-known factors. Grounding a technological rule on explanatory laws does not 
necessarily mean that every aspect of it (and of its relations with the context) is 
understood. Typically, several aspects keep their “black box” character and testing within 
the context is still very necessary to account for its effectiveness
7. 
     The typical research design to study and test technological rules is the multiple case: a 
series of problems of the same class is solved, each by applying the problem solving 
cycle.  Design knowledge is built up through the reflective cycle (Van Aken, 1994): 
choosing a case, planning and implementing interventions (on the basis of the problem 
solving cycle), reflecting on the results and developing design knowledge to be tested and 
refined in subsequent cases. 
     In developing and testing a technological rule through the multiple case and in 
analysing its effectiveness through the cross-case analysis during the reflective cycle, one 
can gain insight in the indications and contra-indications for the application of that rule 
and hence also in its application-domain. A technological rule is typically not totally 
general, but applicable to a certain application-domain, a class of problems. 
     By borrowing concepts from software development (see e.g. Dolan and Matthews, 
1993) one can say that research on technological rules typically goes through a stage of α -
testing, i.e. testing and further development by the originator of the rule, to be followed 
by a stage of β -testing, i.e. the testing of the rule by third parties. 
 
 
TECHNOLOGICAL RULES IN THE FIELD OF MANAGEMENT   
 
Academic research in design sciences combines description-driven and prescription-
driven research. However, the paradigm of these sciences holds that its ultimate goal is 
the development of tested and grounded technological rules to be used by the 
professionals in their field. My thesis is that in the field of management the development 
of more prescription-driven research programmes, i.e. research on the basis of the 
paradigm of the design sciences, would contribute markedly to the solution of its 
utilisation problem. The use of this paradigm would lead to different research products, 
i.e. technological rules






Technological rules derived from description-driven research  
 
This is not to say that the rich results of present description-driven research programmes 
would not contribute. Many available research results can be used to derive technological 
rules, like: 
•  if you want to realise a large-scale, complex strategic change, use a process of 
logical incrementalism (Quinn, 1980) 
•  if you want effective realization of the outcomes of strategic decision-making, 
promote perceived procedural fairness (Korsgaard, Schweiger and Sapienza, 
1995) and active participation of middle management (Woolridge and Floyd, 
1990)  
•  if you want to manage the activities within the operational core of a professional 
organisation, use standardisation of skills rather than direct supervision 
(Mintzberg, 1983). 
Such technological rules are to be used as design exemplars as they do not give a specific 
course of action. However, the original research results were not formulated as 
technological rules. In description-driven research management implications tend to be 
treated more or less as an afterthought of the analysis and are not tested as such. As will 
be discussed below, in research based on the paradigm of the design sciences, ß-testing of 
technological rules is a key element of its research strategy. 
 
 
Research products, based on the paradigm of the design sciences 
 
There are significant differences between the causal models of description-driven 
research and the technological rules of prescription-driven research. Their causal logic is 
comparable: one or more dependent variables are caused, deterministically or 
stochastically, by one or more independent ones. However, one difference lies in the 
nature of the independent variables: in the case of the causal model these are elements 
already present in reality (and not always manipulable), while in the case of the rule it is a 
newly designed intervention or artefact. Often the dependent variables are also different. 
For causal models in the field of management the “bottom line” (or organisational 
effectiveness) is a much used result variable (see e.g. Lewin and Minton, 1986; March 
and Sutton, 1997). March and Sutton show that the mechanisms causing variation in 
overall organisational performance are unstable. To this one may add that overall 
performance is typically not only influenced by the independent variables of interest, but 
by many more organisational and contextual variables as well. So the impact of the 
independent variables tends to “drown in noise”, forcing the researcher to restrict himself 
or herself to analyse only those independent variables that have a real strong impact on 
the bottom line. On the other hand, when testing technological rules one tends to 
investigate short causal chains. The dependent variable is not the ultimate overall 
organisational performance, but rather one or more operational variables, like the 
question whether an intended change is indeed realised. 
     Causal models can be and often are partial and so explain only certain aspects of the 
phenomenon of interest. If they are quantitative, they tend also to be strongly  
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reductionistic, forced by the need for quantification. Technological rules, on the other 
hand, are holistic. A given intervention is applied in a certain context and all 
organisational and contextual factors have an impact on its outcome. Some of the 
mechanisms determining its effectiveness will be analysed to ground the technological 
rule, but other factors will retain their “black box” character. The description of rule, 




Research strategies, based on the paradigm of the design sciences  
 
Not only the intended research products are different, so too are the research strategies. 
Prescription-driven research is solution-focused, rather than problem-focused. Of course 
the problem is analysed, but the emphasis of analysis is on those aspects which determine 
the choice and effectiveness of the solution. This means, among other things, that already 
after an initial scan of the problem some possible solutions are explored, the results of 
which guide further problem analysis. 
     Research to develop and test technological rules in management will be “clinical 
research”, i.e. the rules will be tested in context, typically using a multiple-case design. It 
can first go through a stage of “α -testing”, i.e. analysis of the effectiveness of a certain 
rule in the original context (like Quinn’s, 1980, research into logical incrementalism). But 
invaluable insight can be gained by subsequent “β -testing” (see Dolan and Matthews, 
1993), i.e. translating the rule to other contexts, having third parties use it, assess its 
effectiveness and make final improvements. One might compare β -testing with 
replication research, advocated by Tsang and Kwan (1999) for description-driven 
management research. It is this β -testing, which can provide further insight into the 
indications and contra-indications for the rule and hence in its application-domain. In 
principle, much material is already available from some form of testing, since many top 
academic researchers also have consultancy practices. These practices are, in essence, the 
translation of their research results to other contexts and both the successes, and 
especially the less than successful applications, should provide much insight. 
Unfortunately, such material is too little published. Nevertheless, such testing is still not 
full β -testing.  An essential  element of  β -testing is that testing is conducted by a third 
party to counteract the “unrecognized defenses” of the originator of the rule, which may 
blind him or her to possible flaws in its use (Argyris, 1996).  
     The testing of managerial technological rules has much in common with evaluation 
research of social programmes, like crime prevention or schooling programmes (see, e.g. 
Cook and Campell, 1979; Guba and Lincoln, 1989 and especially Pawson and Tilly, 
1997). Such evaluation research is by its very nature testing-in-context. Following 
Pawson and Tilly (1997), the key question  is not so much whether ‘it’ works, but what is 
it about the programme that makes it work in terms of explaining mechanisms. Their 
starting point is what they call the basic realist formula: mechanism + context = outcome. 
These mechanisms may include both impersonal, material factors and personal 
interpretations and discourses of the actors involved. So such testing does not make a 
paradigmatic choice between a structure and an agency-view. Like Schulz and Hatch  
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(1996) we do not accept Burrell and Morgan’s incommensurability argument with respect 
to paradigm diversity in organization theory.  
     A managerial technological rule will not  usually be grounded in terms of general 
laws, as may be the case in engineering, but rather in terms of explaining mechanisms. An 
example of the use of impersonal factors as explaining mechanisms is Goldratt’s Theory-
of-Constraints (Goldratt and Cox, 1986). The rule is that in managing a factory one 
should focus on optimising the use of the constraining capacity group. The explaining 
mechanism is that it is this group that determines the output of the factory as a whole. An 
example of the use of more personal factors can be found in Tichy’s TPC-model. One 
rule is that if a given strategic change hurts the real interests of a certain subgroup, one 
should use political interventions rather than technical or cultural ones. The explaining 
mechanism is that technical, i.e. content-oriented interventions will demonstrate even 
more clearly to that group that their interests will be hurt, which will not help to 
overcome their resistance to the change, that cultural interventions, i.e. inviting 
participation, will give them the opportunity to organise a coalition against the change, 
while political, i.e. power interventions can be accepted as being the duty of top 
management to act in the interests of the organisation as a whole. 
     ß-testing of managerial technological rules is interested in both driving and in blocking 
explaining mechanisms (instances where the rule fails are also highly interesting). It is 
especially this grounding in driving and blocking explaining mechanisms which will 
support the translation of the rule to other contexts. 
     A key criterion for distinguishing academic research results from the prescriptions 
found in “Heathrow-literature”, is justification. The effectiveness of an algorithmic 
technological rule (applied as recipe) can be proven conclusively in deterministic or 
stochastic terms. But the indeterminate nature of heuristic rules - and most technological 
rules in the field of management will be heuristic - makes it impossible to provide such  
conclusive proof. However, through multiple case-studies one can accumulate supporting 
evidence which can continue until “theoretical saturation” (Eisenhardt, 1989) has been 
obtained. 
     In the case of algorithmic rules, the evidence can be left out after it has been 
assessed. Application and further research can be based on the rules themselves. In the 
case of  
heuristic rules, the evidence remains part of the results. In order to use the results for  
application or for further research, one keeps needing the evidence - either as it is or in 
condensed form - to forecast the effectiveness of the application and for translation into 
the new context. 
   The argument is summarised in Table 1, showing the main differences between 










characteristic  Description-driven research 
programmes 
Prescription-driven 
research programmes  
 
dominant paradigm  explanatory sciences   design sciences 
 focus  problem focused  solution focused  
 typical research question  explanation  alternative solutions for a 
class of problems 
 typical research product  causal model;  
quantitative law 
tested and grounded 
technological rule  
 nature of research product   algorithm  heuristic 
 justification   proof   saturated evidence 
 
Table 1.  The main differences between description-driven and prescription-driven 
                research programmes. 
   
 
 
Description and prescription in functional management fields  
 
The tensions between description-driven and prescription-driven research and between 
the academic and the professional reputation systems do not only exist in the field of 
organisation and management theory in general, but also in functional areas like  
Operations Management, Management of Technology, Marketing Management and 
Human Resources Management. The situation in these areas is somewhat different, 
because here professional associations, which publish journals and organise conferences, 
bring together practitioners and academics. These conferences tend to suffer less from 
what Hambrick calls the “incestuous, closed loop” of the American Academy of 
Management conferences (Hambrick, 1994, p. 13). Furthermore, in these fields one finds 
more academics with mixed academic/professional backgrounds as opposed to academics 
with purely academic backgrounds. This causes some more interest in the utility of 
research products and in the professional reputation system.  
   However, the forces of the academic reputation system are also felt  strongly in these 
fields as is illustrated by the following two examples. In the field of Operations 
Management Meredith, Raturi, Amoake-Gyampath and Kaplan (1989) bemoan the 
dominance in their field of Operations Research - high in academic prestige - at the 
expense of research products more relevant for real-life problems (see also Whitley, 1988, 
on the clash between the two reputation systems in this field). In Management of 
Technology Ottosson castigates the “terror of statistical investigations”, “concentrating on 
measurable numbers to get nice tables processed with advanced computer programs”, 
which are “well received in scientific society”, but leave “managers and entrepreneurs, 
seeking useful theories  for their every-day businesses” in the cold (Ottosson, 1998, p. 
236). 
     Nevertheless, because of its more instrumental nature, the literature in these functional 
fields does give practitioners, like marketing managers and logistic managers, essential 
knowledge without which they would perform suboptimally. One may compare this with 
our field of management-in-general, which as yet provides fairly little instrumental  
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knowledge (exceptions being e.g. psychological theories on motivation, which score high 
on both utility and validity according to Miner, 1984, and research on organisational 
change management, which often has a strong instrumental component). 
 
 
THE UTILITY OF TECHNOLOGICAL RULES IN THE FIELD OF MANAGEMENT 
 
The quest for prescriptions in the field of management is as old as the field itself and was 
not invented here. It is older than the tradition of description-driven research based on the 
trinity of description, explanation and prediction.  My proposition, therefore, is not the 
invention of the idea of prescription, but to take prescription-driven management research 
serious academically by rigorous testing and grounding. 
   By their very nature technological rules are much more application-oriented than the 
causal models of description-driven research. I discuss here the utility of technological 
rules by examining the extent to which they fulfil the five key user-needs of practitioners 
regarding (academic) management theory as developed by Thomas and Tymon (1982) on 
the basis of various criticisms of such theory. 
•  Descriptive relevance or external validity: the raison d’être of a technological rule 
is its external validity as established by the multiple case-studies discussed above. 
•  Goal relevance or the extent to which research results refer to matters the 
practitioner wishes to influence: in a prescription-driven research programme goal 
relevance is a key criterion for the choice of rules to be developed, tested and 
grounded. 
•  Operational validity or the extent to which the practitioner is able to control the 
independent variables in the model: the very nature of a technological rule assures 
its operational validity. 
•  Non-obviousness: because a technological rule is not forced into a reductionistic 
format as quantitative causal models are, there is little danger of overly obvious 
research results. 
•  Timeliness: a practitioner need arising from the “incredible long periods of time” 
required to adequately assess organisational phenomena and the scientists’ 
reluctance to make recommendations before all the facts are in (Thomas and 
Tymon, 1982, p. 349): in this respect the technological rule has no advantage over 
the causal model; for classes of management problems for which timeliness is a 
real issue, the practitioner will have to deal with consultants rather than with 
academic researchers. 
 
This brings me to the overall conclusion that on the basis of the Thomas and Tymon 
criteria, generally speaking, the utility of the technological rule is significantly higher than 
that of the traditional causal model. 
 
 
CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION 
 
The main thesis advanced here is that by and large the utilisation problem of academic 
management theory is caused by its very nature. Predominantly, such theory is the result  
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of description-driven research, with the causal model as the typical output. This is a plea 
to combine description-driven research programmes with prescription-driven ones, which 
can lead to more instrumental knowledge in the form of tested and grounded technological 
rules. 
     Both types of programmes could well operate in a profitable partnership: the former 
providing causal models to be used by the latter to ground technological rules, the latter 
providing further insight into the nature of managerial processes and generating new 
research questions.  Such an approach would meet Dewey’s (1929) criticisms on the 
traditional separation of knowledge and action and follow Starbuck and Nyström’s (1981) 
adage, “if you want to understand a system, try to change it”. 
     I used analogies with design sciences like medicine and engineering to show the 
potential of such a partnership for academic research in the field of management. This is 
not to say that I expect that its results will obtain the privileged status of the foremost 
source of knowledge for practitioners as is the case in these disciplines. Although in the 
heady days of the scientisation of Business Schools, Andrews (1969) did argue that 
management should be regarded as a profession, there are also reasons not to do so (see, 
e.g. Realin, 1990)
9. One is that formal managerial knowledge, i.e. formal knowledge on 
management-in-general, is not as central to managerial success as such knowledge is in 
“strong” professions. Managers will continue to be inspired by a range of sources of 
knowledge. However, in my opinion, academic management research should at least 
strive to be one of the more important of these sources. 
          Several authors, like Koontz (1961; 1980) and Pfeffer (1993), argue that the variety 
of approaches advocated in organisation and management literature is a sign of 
immaturity of the field. On the contrary, variety can be a source of inspiration for 
practitioners. In my opinion, variety is an expression of the richness of the field. Besides, 
it is doubtful whether practitioners expect the field to develop one Grand and Unified 
Management Theory. What is possibly a sign of immaturity is the plethora of unopposed 
so-called management fads (Byrne, 1986; Pascale, 1990, p. 20). It could be a rewarding 
task for prescription-driven research to do some weeding here with the help of some 
rigorous testing and grounding. 
     An increasing interest in prescription-driven management research could lead – in 
terms of McKinley et al. – to a certain “school of thought” , i.e. an integrated theoretical 
framework that provides a distinct view on organizations and that is associated with an 
active stream of empirical research (McKinley, Mone and Moon, 1999, p. 635). However, 
a more ambitious result would be an effective partnership of description-driven and 
prescription-driven research in many schools of thought, thus giving our field the 
character of a technology more than that of a basic science, or – in terms of Gibbons et al. 
(1994) – increasing the use of mode 2 knowledge production in our field. 
     Whether that will happen, will ultimately be a matter of values. Academics may 
consider it unacademic to be much concerned with praxis, rather like Roman senators who 
were not supposed to be involved in craft or trade. A quest for tested and grounded 
technological rules, which in the field of management will be predominantly qualitative 
and heuristic by nature, means trading the priestly beauty of truth for the soldiery glory of 
performance (to paraphrase March and Sutton, 1997) and that may be too high a price. 
Some may fear that a stronger praxis-orientation will cause the field to relapse into a  
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“practice-based craft”. In medieval times, the medical doctor did not soil his hands, but 
left the butchery to the chirurgeon. In modern times, this barber-surgeon emancipated and 
became an academically respectable surgeon. Ultimately, I expect this to happen to utility-
conscious academic management researchers too, as long as they focus on rigorous testing 





1.  In this article I use the term “scientific” like the German “wissenschaftlich” or the 
Dutch “wetenschappelijk”, meaning “according to sound academic standards”; 
thus, its meaning is not confined to the natural sciences. 
2.  Some authors, like Child (1995) and Koza and Thoenig (1995), suggest that in our 
field one might contrast a European tradition, which is concerned more with the 
academic reputation system, with an American one, which is concerned more with 
the professional reputation system. This may be true for European scholars with a 
background predominantly in sociology, but not necessarily so for organisation 
and management scholars with a different background. 
3.  In a discussion on the quality of research products in the field of strategic 
management, Montgomery, Wernerfelt and Balakrishnan admit that “sciences 
should be undertaken for the sake of ultimate application” (Montgomery et al., 
1989, p.191), but then proceed to stress the “ultimate” in their statement, urging 
editors of academic journals not to demand direct application of the research 
products presented (as if they always do), thus leaving more room for the fine 
tuning of (descriptive) theory. In a reaction Seth and Zinkhan (1991) take it a step 
further and complain that Montgomery et al. are too application-oriented [sic] and 
propose that “if strategic management is to become a science it must strive 
towards “explaining by law” the phenomena of interest (Seth and Zinkhan, 1991, 
p.80), thus forcing their causal models into a reductionistic, quantitative format. 
4.  Pelz (1978) also discussed a third type of use, viz. symbolic use of scientific 
knowledge: the use of that knowledge to legitimate predetermined positions. This 
type of utilisation is, however, less relevant for the present discussion. 
5.  In the context of the design sciences, Simon primarily discusses construction 
problems, while in this article the design sciences may also deal with improvement 
problems. 
6.  It is the mission of Design Research and Design Theory (see, e.g. Cross, 1993; 
Evbuomwan, Sivaloganathan and Jebb, 1996; Hubka and Eder, 1996) to contribute 
to the process knowledge of the designer. However, the gap between design theory 
and design practice is at least as large as the gap between management theory and 
practice, see, e.g. Norman (1996), Dorst (1997) and Van Handenhoven and 
Trassaert (1999). It is with respect to object knowledge that (academic) research in 
the design sciences is so successful, not with respect to process knowledge. 
7  This is not to say that all technological rules have to be tested within their context. 
In the engineering sciences in particular, it is possible to isolate certain research 
subjects from their context without losing essential characteristics.  
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8  “Action theories”, as discussed by Argyris, Putnam and McLain Smith (1985, 
chapter 3), can be seen as technological rules in the field of management. 
9  Or see the balanced discussion of this issue by Squires (2001, pp. 483-485), who 
concludes that management may not be a “strong” profession, but still has several 
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